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Wiping the Slate . . . Dirty
THE INADEQUACIES OF EXPUNGEMENT AS A
SOLUTION TO THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
OF FEDERAL CONVICTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Start over with a clean slate.1 Get a fresh start. These are
phrases that might be on the minds of thousands of convicted
Americans each year as they reenter the free society. In the
federal prison system alone, there are currently 188,722 total
federal inmates.2 Overall, the United States prison population
stands at 2,217,947—in contrast to Russia’s total prison
population, a mere 649,836.3 Comparatively, the United States
accounts for 4.4% of the total world population and roughly
22% of the entire prison population.4 The essential question is,
however, can ex-offenders wipe the slate clean?5
For people like Haywood Speight, the answer appears to
be no.6 Mr. Speight, a thirty-four-year-old Alabama resident,
1 See generally Clean Slate, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/clean%20slate (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (definition for “clean slate”).
2 Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
population_statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/W7DH-J67X] (last updated Apr. 20, 2017).
Moreover, roughly 8.6% “of the total adult U.S. population, have recorded felony
convictions.” JAMESB. JACOBS, THEETERNALCRIMINALRECORD 1 (2015).
3 United States of America, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.
org/country/united-states-america [https://perma.cc/SCY7-JABU]; Russian Federation,
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/russian-federation [https://
perma.cc/2K9M-PY4G].
4 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the
World’s Population and One Quarter of the World’s Prisoners?, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/30/does-the-united-states-
really-have-five-percent-of-worlds-population-and-one-quarter-of-the-worlds-prisoners/?
utm_term=.282ef46746d6 [https://perma.cc/T34S-T6BU].
5 Margaret Love notes that collateral consequences of criminal convictions,
“result i[n] convicted felons hav[ing] no realistic hope of satisfying their debt to society,
or regaining a place in it.” Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In
Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705,
1705 (2003).
6 See Rachel Osler Lindley, Life After Prison: Ex-offenders Face Many
Challenges When Reentering Society, WBHM (June 22, 2014), https://news.wbhm.org/
feature/2014/life-after-prison-ex-offenders-face-many-challenges-when-reentering-society/
[https://perma.cc/EY53-DE5R].
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was convicted of burglary in 2006.7 In 2014, after two and a
half years of being released, Speight still had not obtained
steady employment.8 He committed himself to living a lawful
existence since release and resided with his father, whom he
cared for.9 Speight is lucky he had a “support system” to aid in
his transition back to freedom, however, familial support itself
still did not ensure Speight employability or the independence
he strived to achieve.10 Here, the goal of rehabilitating an ex-
offender appears accomplished,11 for Mr. Speight exhibited law-
abiding behavior; however, Speight’s dismal employment
prospects inhibited his ability to fully return to society. Studies
have shown that the earlier ex-offenders obtain employment,
the less likely they are to recidivate.12
Scholars and commentators have recognized the societal
displacement ex-offenders face due to their criminal records13
and have argued for various legislative methods to correct this
“semi-outlaw status.”14 Arguably, the most important component
of curing the negative connotation of being an ex-offender is the
ability to maintain employment.15 Employment is seen as a
“rehabilitative necessity” to ensure offenders do not repeat past
behavior.16 Unfortunately, for countless individuals such as Mr.
Speight, employment discrimination based on prior criminal
justice system exposure is pervasive.
Academics argue that the expansion of criminal record
expungement would rectify the lack of employment opportunities
for this group and correct the general societal imbalance ex-
offenders face.17 Wiping away an ex-offender’s past transgression
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Bruce Bayley et al., Why We Incarcerate: Rehabilitation,
CORRECTIONSONE.COM (July 16, 2012), https://www.correctionsone.com/jail-management/
articles/5826786-Why-we-incarcerate-Rehabilitation/ [https://perma.cc/6DV4-Y3LW].
12 Peter Cove & Lee Bowles, Immediate Access to Employment Reduces
Recidivism, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (June 11, 2015), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
articles/2015/06/11/immediate_access_to_employment_reduces_recidivism_126939.html.
13 See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness,
Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J.
753, 755 (2011). Love describes “the phenomenon of ‘internal exile’” whereby ex-offenders
are pushed out of traditional society because of their criminal status. Id.
14 Id. at 754–55.
15 Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for
Non-violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 162 (2010).
16 Id. at 165; JACOBS, supra note 2, at 221–22.
17 See generally Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement Law: A
Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403 (2015); Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us
Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1
(2008); Silva, supra note 15.
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is seen as a public act of forgiveness that removes the
possibility of an ex-offender being stigmatized by his or her
criminal record—either by the public or by employers.18 The
expungement of a criminal record entails erasing the conviction,
essentially removing it from history.19 This note contends that
the expungement of criminal records, specifically federal
criminal records, is not a viable procedure.
Currently, there is no comprehensive federal20 legislation
that broadly authorizes expungement,21 and rightfully so. There
are very few federal statutes that specifically authorize
expungement of criminal records.22 As a result, federal
expungement of criminal records has been left up to federal
district courts to authorize.23 Although district courts have
condoned federal expungement of criminal records in extreme
cases,24 the federal circuit courts are currently in disagreement25
as to whether district courts have proper jurisdiction to consider
18 Raj Mukherji, In Search of Redemption: Expungement of Federal Criminal
Records 48 (May 1, 2013) (unpublished comment) (on file with the Seton Hall University
eRepository), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=student_
scholarship [https://perma.cc/R29K-3HGP].
19 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 113 n.*. James B. Jacobs is also a preeminent
American scholar on the topic of criminal law and, in particular, collateral consequences.
See generally James B. Jacobs, NYU LAW, https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cf
m?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=20016 [https://perma.cc/BE8T-T9PT].
20 Many states have their own expungement schemes, which greatly vary from
state to state. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 117. This note will not deal with matters of state law.
21 Mukherji, supra note 18, at 10.
22 Kessler, supra note 17, at 427. For example, the Federal First Offender Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2012), authorizes expungement for an offender under the age of twenty-
one (at the time of the offense), who is guilty of knowingly or intentionally possessing a
controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 844, does not have any previous drug convictions
and completes probation with a deferred judgment. 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (a)–(c). This statute
is very narrow in scope and does not apply broadly across a spectrum of crimes, rather
only to knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C.
§ 844. Id.
23 Silva, supra note 15, at 185.
24 See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1020, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding
that where an individual is detained, rather than arrested, and there are no grounds
(evidence) for such a detention, “sound principles of justice and judicial administration
dictate that in general actions to vindicate constitutional rights, by expungement of
arrest records . . . [where there is an] absence of probable cause for arrest, be
maintained against . . . law enforcement agencies involved”); see also United States v.
McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 749–50 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that where police arrested
individuals solely to interfere with their voting rights, with no proper basis to do so, the
arrest and conviction records of those individuals should be expunged).
25 Most federal circuit courts to decide this issue since the Supreme Court
case Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America (which outlined the boundaries
of the ancillary jurisdiction required for federal district courts to expunge criminal
records based upon equitable considerations) held that district courts do not have
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records based upon equitable considerations. Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). Citations to all federal circuit
court cases are omitted here, but are detailed in full infra Section II.B. A recent case, Doe
v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), is going up to the Second Circuit
for review on this matter, and will be explained further infra Section II.C.
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expungement based on equitable considerations.26 The Supreme
Court has not yet to grant certiorari to decide this issue27 and
has denied certiorari in three cases.28
This note tracks the enigmatic history of federal
expungement law and argues for the denial of federal judicial
expungement. This note will, instead, propose a workable solution
that augments the economic opportunities available to ex-
offenders to alleviate the challenges these ex-offenders face.29
Additionally, this note will clarify the reasons why expungement
is an inadequate solution to the collateral consequences ex-
offenders face.
Part I of this note will unpack the history of the limited
expungement remedy in the United States, including some of
the general philosophies behind punishment. Part II will
explore the federal circuit case law surrounding expungement
based on equitable considerations30 to elucidate the disagreement
among the circuits on this issue. Part II will also provide a
summary of a recent expungement case in the Second Circuit,
United States v. Doe31 and explain the legal issues
encompassing federal expungement of criminal records, as well
as highlight the employment discrimination issues facing ex-
offenders. Part III will explore the reasons why the outright
expansion of federal criminal expungement is not a viable
option in modern society and will briefly contrast the United
26 Mukherji, supra 18, at 10. The term “equitable considerations” is not precisely
defined by courts in terms of the exact considerations, however, “[i]n determining whether
such circumstances exist, courts have considered the ‘delicate balancing of the equities
between the right of privacy of the individual and the right of law enforcement officials to
perform their necessary duties.’” United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir.
1977) (quoting United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
Furthermore, expungement is seen as an extreme remedy. Id. at 539. For example, courts
granted expungement “where [an] arrest was proper but was based on a statute later
declared unconstitutional.” Id. at 540.
27 See Expungement, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/expungement/#simplified
[https://perma.cc/ZAC6-RCZ5].
28 Id. Those three cases are United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.
2007), Rowlands v. United States, 451 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2006), and United States v. Sapp,
No. CR 95-40068 SBA, 2011 WL 2837913 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011).
29 This note will focus on the federal (rather than state) expungement of criminal
convictions (although the expungement of arrest records will be discussed in passing from
case law). This note will not comment on the expungement of wrongful criminal convictions
of innocent persons, although conversations surrounding wrongful convictions have
increased lately in popular media. See, e.g., Serial, WBEZ CHICAGO (2014) (downloaded
using iTunes); MAKING AMURDERER (Netflix 2015).
30 “A motion seeking equitable expungement requires a court to make an
individualized assessment of whether, as a matter of fairness, a moving party’s criminal-
justice records should be publicly available.” Steven F. Reich, Expungement of Criminal
Records in Federal Courts, L.J. NEWSL. (Oct. 2009), https://www.manatt.com/uploaded
Files/Attorneys_and_Advisors/Reich,_Steven_F/Business%20Crimes%20Bulletin_Reich.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SSV7-YX3X].
31 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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States’ stance on expungement against the European model.
Finally, Part IV will provide a blueprint for an alternative to
expungement, namely, the federal use of certificates of
rehabilitation and increased economic tax incentives for
employers to hire ex-offenders.
I. HISTORICALUNDERPINNINGS OF EXPUNGEMENT LAW
The expungement of a criminal record is the “process by
which a record of criminal conviction is destroyed or sealed by the
state or federal repository.”32 The history of federal expungement
law in the United States is not a clearly delineated story.33
Therefore, to understand the concept of expungement itself, and
where it originates, it is helpful to examine global philosophical
ideas concerning punishment and its justifications. If the
remedy of expungement is used to correct the negative influence
that a criminal record can have on an ex-offender’s life, then the
record itself must be seen as a relic of punishment.34
A. Origins of Punishment and Rehabilitation
Many ancient civilizations punished offenders by
demarcating their status in society, including, for instance, by
the forfeiture of civil rights or property.35 This trend continued
into medieval England;36 for example, a felony conviction in
during this time resulted in the defendant forfeiting all of his
civil rights.37 Although the United States did not completely
follow this historical model, there are certain citizenship rights
that the United States denies its ex-offenders.38 The rights
denied to offenders include the right to vote, the right to serve
on a jury, the right to keep and bear arms, and the right to run
for elected office. Further, ex-offenders are disqualified from
social welfare benefits, certain civil government positions, and
obtaining federal student financial aid.39 The idea of permanently
punishing offenders by separating and differentiating their
32 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 113 n.* (quoting Expungement of Record, BLACK’S
LAWDICTIONARY 603 (7th ed. 1999)).
33 Id. at 114–15.
34 SeeMouzon, supra note 17, at 35.
35 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 2, at 246.
36 Id. at 246–47.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 247–48.
39 See generally JACOBS, supra note 2, at ch. 13 (The rights and disqualifications
presented above are nonexhaustive, and further rights are noted in the Jacobs text.).
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citizenship rights from those of mainstream society persists in
modern American philosophy.40
While it is clear that publicly punishing ex-offenders41
has a deep history, notions of rehabilitating convicted
individuals began to arise in the latter half of the seventeenth
century in France.42 Rehabilitation of a criminal is taken to
mean restoring that person’s law-abiding behavior.43 In French
law, rehabilitating a criminal meant “‘undoing’ . . . a criminal
conviction.”44 Despite a lack of thorough historical perspective
on rehabilitation in the seventeenth century,45 some countries
in eighteenth-century Europe embraced rehabilitation because
they believed offenders were rational and possessed free will.46
In the late nineteenth century, the United States used
prisons as a tool to rehabilitate offenders—reformers believed
that offenders might reflect on their misdeeds and change
themselves from within.47 At first, authorities believed that the
rehabilitation of an individual criminal was the criminal’s own
responsibility,48 but as time progressed, prisons became known
as “reformatories” and places where criminals could receive
individualized treatment, including occupational training to
rehabilitate themselves.49 During this time,50 a shift in
criminology51 within the rehabilitative model took hold, and the
judicial system sought to order lengthier sentences that would
persuade offenders to “voluntarily desist from future criminal
conduct.”52 Rehabilitation received criticism across the political
spectrum; some argued that it “facilitat[ed] discrimination”
while others said it tended to paternalize offenders.53 The idea
40 Id. at 247–64.
41 Publicly punishing refers to the publicizing of ex-offenders’ status, to place
shame on them to deter future criminal acts.
42 Gwen Robinson & Iain Crow, Introducing, Rehabilitation: The Theoretical
Context, in OFFENDER REHABILITATION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 2 (2009).
43 Id. Admittedly, this is not the only precise definition of rehabilitating an
ex-offender, as Robinson and Crow point out. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 4.
47 Kathryn M. Campbell, Rehabilitation Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS
&CORRECTIONALFACILITIES 831 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 I am referring to the late nineteenth and early-to-mid-twentieth centuries
in the United States. Robinson & Crow, supra note 42, at 4–5.
51 This shift in criminology refers to the change between a view of a criminal
as a rational being with free will and the view that a criminal is prey to external and
internal forces that shape his or her behavior and, therefore, should be cured of the
cause of his or her “offending.” Id. at 4. This new theory is known as “positivism,” and it
permeated American punishment philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 5.
52 JACOBS, supra at note 2, at 221; see also Robinson & Crow, supra note 42, at 5.
53 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 221.
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of an offender having complete control over his or her behavior
fell back into favor.54
Although no longer completely championed, the
rehabilitative model is important to the discussion of expungement
of criminal records because it helps explain why some scholars
argue for the expansion of expungement law.55 Logically, scholars
argue, if one of the current goals of the United States’ criminal
justice system is to rehabilitate an individual, then each part of
the criminal justice system should strive to implement
rehabilitative ideals to reach that goal.56 If obtaining employment
is a crucial step toward an ex-offender achieving rehabilitation57
(namely, law-abiding behavior), then the criminal justice
system should not impede the ability of an ex-offender to obtain
employment. If the retention of criminal records impedes an ex-
offender’s ability to obtain employment, then as part of the
rehabilitative goal, criminal records should be expunged
wherever possible.58 This logic starts to fall apart when even a
few assertions are introduced: rehabilitation is not the only
goal of the criminal justice system,59 and the complete removal
of criminal records may not be attainable in the modern age.60
B. The Brief Federal Legislative History of Expungement
and the History of Creating Criminal Records
As a result of the rehabilitative model that became
popular in the mid-1900s, juvenile courts in the United States
began to experiment with expunging juvenile criminal records
in an effort to afford juvenile offenders greater life prospects.61
Authorities thought that since youth offenders are not fully
54 Robinson & Crow, supra note 42, at 5.
55 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 220–21; see generally Kessler, supra note 17, at
403; Mouzon, supra note 17, at 1; Silva, supra note 15, at 155.
56 See generally Francis T. Cullen, It’s Time to Reaffirm Rehabilitation, 5
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 665 (2006); Francis T. Cullen, The Twelve People Who
Saved Rehabilitation: How the Science of Criminology Made a Difference, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2005).
57 See Silva, supra note 15, at 162.
58 See generally Mukherji, supra note 18.
59 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 220.
60 See Silva, supra note 15, at 204 (Particularly, the private ownership of criminal
record information may hinder public attempts to contain such information.). It is worth
noting that in other parts of the world, namely Europe, rehabilitation is a more central goal
in sentencing. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 221. Therefore, “[b]ecause publicly accessible
criminal records stigmatize those who have been convicted, disclosing information about
individual criminal history is regarded as substantially impeding that rehabilitative goal.”
Id. In fact, England appears to embrace countrywide legislation to aid ex-offenders to gain
employment. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, c. 53, § 4 (Eng.).
61 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESEARCH REVIEW:
IMPACT OF THE YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT 1 (1985); JACOBS, supra note 2, at 114.
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developed, they “would be more responsive to rehabilitative
programs than older, ‘hardened’ prisoners.”62 In 1950, the
United States Congress passed the Federal Youth Corrections
Act (YCA) to help achieve rehabilitation for “eighteen- to
twenty-six-year-old federal offenders.”63 If the youth offenders
successfully completed their programs, and the “court released
them early from probation” then their convictions would be “set
aside.”64 From the legislative history of the YCA, it is unclear
whether Congress meant to completely expunge a youth offender’s
conviction or simply make it “a token statement of rehabilitation.”65
In either case, Congress believed that “setting aside” a youth
offender’s conviction would help reduce the stigma attached to a
criminal conviction and aid the goal of rehabilitation.66
Congress repealed the YCA in 1984.67 Studies
demonstrated that YCA offenders were “less willing than [their]
non-YCA counterparts to be involved in treatment programs.”68
Moreover, housing solely YCA inmates together created
increased violent conditions.69 In effect, the YCA demonstrated
an unstable outcome that Congress was no longer willing to
support.70 Congress has not enacted any comprehensive federal
adult expungement legislation to date.71
Perhaps one reason why Congress did not originally
consider expungement as a method to remove conviction stigma
was that criminal records were not widely available until the
national and statewide integration of such records.72 The “rap
sheet” did not evolve until the beginning of the twentieth
century when law enforcement replaced “haphazard notes”
with a centralized document for each offender.73 To further the
collection of nation-wide criminal information, among other
62 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 61, at 1.
63 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 116; see Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, 18
U.S.C. §§ 5005–26 (1950) (repealed 1984).
64 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 116.
65 Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 484 (1981).
66 Id. at 483–84.
67 Ed Bruske, Youth Act Repealed, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 1984), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1984/10/13/youth-act-repealed/bc7189d0-1f2e-4881-a
633-6b938d053fe7/?utm_term=.d7b579b6e1e6 [https://perma.cc/QWE3-ZB6M].
68 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 61, at 4–5.
69 Id. at 5.
70 Id.
71 Mukherji, supra note 18, at 10. During the later part of the twentieth
century, Congress has considered expungement legislation but has failed to pass any as of
yet. Id.
72 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 32–33; see also Gary Fields, What to Know About
Expungement of Criminal Records, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/
2014/12/26/what-to-know-about-expungement-of-criminal-records-the-short-answer/.
73 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 32–33.
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purposes, Congress created the Bureau of Criminal
Identification in 1924.74 As technology progressed, the FBI
computerized criminal history records; this was an important
step toward ensuring that individual police departments, as well
as federal law enforcement agencies, had the ability to review a
comprehensive record for each offender.75 The result today is the
Interstate Identification Index (III or Triple I) that allows any law
enforcement agency to immediately check a person’s entire
criminal record.76 Beyond law enforcement, federal and state
statutes allow “[private] businesses and volunteer organizations
to indirectly obtain FBI criminal background checks by
submitting requests to their state repository.”77 The sale of
criminal background check information soared from the 1990s to
the present day, with companies providing criminal records
directly to private employers at a relatively low cost.78 Criminal
records became the primary way of exposing an individual’s
criminal history; therefore, it seemed logical to manage the
dissemination of criminal records to curtail negative effects on
an ex-offenders rehabilitation.
C. The Judiciary and Expungement Law
The Supreme Court of the United States, even in the
early nineteenth century, recognized “it is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also
a legal remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded.”79 From this
premise, federal courts have authorized expungement as a
remedy where they find a specific legal right has been violated,
or specific legal injustice has occurred.80
In Peters v. Hobby, a federal employee believed he was
erroneously debarred from federal employment due to an
improper record and sought to have that record removed.81 The
Loyalty Review Board (the Board) alleged that the petitioner
retained membership in the Communist Party and that this
74 Id. at 37. This bureau is now known as the FBI. See id.
75 Id. at 39–40.
76 Id. at 41. This includes any current warrants out for an arrest. See id.
77 Id. at 45.
78 Kessler, supra note 17, at 411–13.
79 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting 3 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23); Thomas R. Frenkel,
Comment, Criminal Record Expungement: The Fifth Circuit Addresses a Split in Authority
Regarding the Modification of Executive Branch Records: Sealed Appellant v. Sealed
Appellee, 130 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1997), 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 627, 629–30 (2000). Frenkel’s article
particularly discusses the expungement of Executive Branch records. Id.
80 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
81 Id. at 333, 335.
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was evidence of disloyalty.82 Therefore, the Board barred the
petitioner from federal service for three years.83 The Court
concluded that the Civil Service Commission must expunge the
“Loyalty Review Board’s finding that there is a reasonable
doubt as to petitioner’s loyalty and to expunge . . . any ruling
that petitioner is barred from federal employment.”84 The Court
used the expungement remedy narrowly to appropriately
alleviate the erroneous violation of the petitioner’s right to his
federal employment post; however, the Court did not reinstate
the petitioner because his post had expired.85 This situation is
quite unlike the expungement of criminal convictions that
scholars commonly advocate for86 because the conviction was
improper in the first place.
Advocates of expungement might appeal to historical
arguments arguing for the remedy to demonstrate useful
precedent. Although it is difficult to locate early twentieth-
century federal court cases specifically identifying the
expungement remedy87 for criminal convictions, there is a
modicum of mid-twentieth century cases that address
expungement in the criminal context.88 In Rogers v. Slaughter, the
court again narrowly defined the scope of the expungement
remedy.89 The appellee in Rogers, a public school teacher,
wrongfully discharged a firearm during school hours.90 The
district court ordered his conviction be set aside, but the Fifth
Circuit held that the expungement “gave the defendant more
relief than if he had been acquitted.”91 In the case of an
acquittal, a court would still have records of the criminal trial
that took place.92 In the court’s opinion, “[t]he judicial editing of
history is likely to produce a greater harm than that sought to
be corrected.”93
82 Id. at 335.
83 Id. at 337.
84 Id. at 349.
85 Id.
86 See generally Kessler, supra note 17, at 403.
87 Peters seems to be one of the earliest, perhaps again this is due to the lack of
widely available public records of criminal convictions. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 32–33.
88 See Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804, 806–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Daniels v. Brown, 349
F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (E.D. Va. 1972).
89 Rogers, 469 F.2d at 1084–85.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See generally Acquittal, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/acquittal [https://perma.cc/47TX-Q4VP] (An acquittal is where “[a]t the end of a
criminal trial, . . . judge or jury [finds] that a defendant is not guilty.”).
93 Rogers, 469 F.2d at 1085.
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That same year, in Daniels v. Brown, the Eastern
District Court of Virginia reiterated, “the remedy of expunction
is not one freely applied.”94 Instead of simply “erasing” the
plaintiff ’s administrative records, the court put a note in the
plaintiff ’s records to give notice to anyone viewing the records
that this particular plaintiff ’s convictions “were voided under
Landman.”95 This solution demonstrated an exercise of limited
judicial power, while also detailing the plaintiff ’s actual record
“to insure that the records are at least given the appropriate
legal weight.”96
These two early cases97 demonstrate the judicial belief
that expungement is a limited remedy.98 As the Fifth Circuit
concluded in Rogers, expunging and wiping away an ex-offender’s
criminal record is the equivalent of saying it never happened,
which is an even greater remedy than an acquittal would be.99
Even today, in the case of expungement, the entire criminal
conviction record, including any record of a criminal trial,
would essentially disappear.100
II. CASEHISTORY OF THE FEDERAL EXPUNGEMENT OF
CRIMINAL RECORDS
The limited history of the expungement remedy in the
United States places into context the current application of
expungement—the use of expungement based upon equitable
considerations in federal courts.101
94 Daniels v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (E.D. Va. 1972).
95 Id. The plaintiff initially sought to have his administrative sanctions
“voided for lack of due process.” Id. at 1289. In Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971), the court ordered this relief, however, the only matter this note is
concerned with on appeal is the question of expungement.
96 Daniels, 349 F. Supp. at 1291.
97 Some cases (both state and federal) predating Rogers and Daniels, express a
balance between the desire to maintain accurate criminal records and the resistance toward
burdening an individual with the existence of a criminal record. See generally In re
Molineaux, 69 N.E. 727, 728 (1904) (stating “An innocent man accused of crime is
sometimes compelled to make sacrifice [in this case having photographs and identifying
information kept as prison records] and undergo suffering for the benefit of society. . . . One,
for the good of all, may be required to submit to imprisonment, incur expense, and endure
mental distress, because the state cannot exist without the preservation of order, and order
cannot be preserved without the punishment of the guilty.”); see alsoUnited States v. Krapf,
285 F.2d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1960) (quoting Judge Augustus N. Hand, “Any restraint on the
person may be burdensome. But some burdens must be borne for the good of the
community.”United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932)).
98 See Rogers, 469 F.2d at 1085; Daniels, 349 F. Supp. at 1291.
99 Rogers, 469 F.2d at 1084–85.
100 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 603 (7th ed. 1999).
101 This note solely focuses on federal expungement of criminal records based
upon equitable considerations. Courts have granted expungement in cases where a
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A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Ancillary
Jurisdiction and Its Effect on Expungement
The Supreme Court case Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America is the most recent and significant case
defining the scope of ancillary jurisdiction—the tool district
courts use to exercise authority over expungement motions.102
Kokkonen primarily involved a contract law dispute.103 The
respondent, Guardian Life, ended Kokkonen’s agreement and
thereafter Kokkonen sued.104 After Guardian Life moved the
case to federal court, a jury trial ensued, “but before the
District Judge instructed the jury, the parties arrived at an
oral agreement settling all claims.”105 The settlement did not,
however, grant “the District Court [authority] to enforce the
settlement agreement.”106 After the parties clashed over terms of
the settlement, Guardian Life “moved in the District Court to
enforce the agreement,” but Kokkonen opposed stating that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.107 The district
court enforced the settlement—siding with Guardian Life—and
relied on an “inherent power” to enforce the order.108 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the district
court in fact possessed such an “inherent supervisory power.”109
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that
“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . . which is
not to be expanded by judicial decree.”110 In the instant case,
the Court recognized that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(ii) governed the settlement dismissal, but gave the
district court further jurisdiction over disputes arising from the
settlement agreement.111 In addition to the “inherent power”
argument, Guardian Life also asserted the alternative argument
that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction112 authorized the district
court to enforce the settlement agreement.113 The Supreme Court
conviction was unconstitutional or illegal. See Tokoph v. United States, 774 F.3d 1300,
1305 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993).
102 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–80 (1994)).
103 Id. at 376–77.
104 Id. at 376.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 377.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341
U.S. 6 (1951)).
111 Id. at 378.
112 Id. Ancillary jurisdiction was defined in this case as, “jurisdiction over
some matters . . . that are incidental to other matters properly before them.” Id.
113 Id. at 378–79.
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concluded that the enforcement of the settlement “is more than
just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence
requires its own basis for jurisdiction.”114
The Court went on to detail the two instances when a
court may assert ancillary jurisdiction, “(1) to permit
disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying
respects and degrees, factually interdependent, . . . and (2) to
enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees.”115 The Court found neither category present in
Guardian’s case.116 As for the first part of ancillary jurisdiction,
the Court held “the facts underlying respondent’s dismissed
claim for breach of agency agreement and those underlying its
claim for breach of settlement agreement have nothing to do
with each other.”117 The second part of ancillary jurisdiction did
not cover the instant case either; while the district court’s order
only dismissed the suit with prejudice, it did not incorporate an
obligation for the parties to comply with the order.118
It is in light of Kokkonen that the discussion of federal
district court expungement of criminal records must proceed
because if a federal district court does not have ancillary
jurisdiction to hear a matter (such as a petition for expungement),
it must dismiss it.119
B. Federal Circuit Case Law
To begin to clarify why the judicial route toward
expungement is not a viable option, it is crucial to consider the
following: (1) the arguments surrounding the issue of whether
a federal district court has ancillary jurisdiction to expunge a
criminal conviction based upon equitable considerations and (2)
the arguments and case precedent in favor of keeping
expungement as a limited remedy.120 Currently, circuit courts are
114 Id.
115 Id. at 379–80 (internal citations omitted).
116 Id. at 380–81.
117 Id. at 380.
118 Id. 380–81. The Court summarized its reasoning at the end of the opinion,
concluding, “[t]he facts to be determined with regard to such alleged breaches of contract
are quite separate from the facts to be determined in the principal suit, and automatic
jurisdiction over such contracts is in no way essential to the conduct of federal-court
business.” Id. at 381.
119 See generally id. (The Court in Kokkonen ultimately centers the opinion
around the limited scope of federal judicial jurisdiction.).
120 Brief for the United States at 16–17, Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192
(2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1967-cr).
974 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:2
split as to the application of ancillary jurisdiction, as the
following discussion will highlight.
In the federal system, the process of expungement based
on equitable considerations begins with a petition for
expungement, which is filed in the district court where the
petitioner’s conviction was enforced.121 The court will then
consider the merits of the application and rule on whether or
not to grant expungement.122 If expungement is granted, all
official records of a conviction, arrest, and any related criminal
proceedings will be ordered abolished.123 Thereafter, a person
may deny having ever been arrested or convicted of that
offense; only the Department of Justice will maintain a
nonpublic record of the offense.124
1. Circuits Authorizing Federal District Court
Expungement
Although some circuit courts have held that federal
district courts have jurisdiction over expungement applications,125
they routinely deny expungement applications that are outside
the scope of the limited remedy.126 Moreover, across different
circuits, courts are inconsistent in the ways they analyze ancillary
jurisdiction and the scope of expungement.127
The earliest case on point, United States v. Linn, dealt
with the expungement of an arrest record rather than a
conviction.128 A jury acquitted appellant of nine counts of various
charges, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and stock fraud.129 The
appellant claimed that this record could be used against him in
the future to “attack his character and reputation both as an
individual and in his professional capacity as an attorney.”130
The Tenth Circuit in Linn pointed out that “[t]raditionally,
121 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 448, 454–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
122 Id.
123 Process for Expunging Federal Criminal Record: Non-disclosure, FREE
ADVICE LEGAL, http://criminal-law.freeadvice.com/criminal-law/arrests_and_searches/
process-for-expunging-federal-criminal-record-non-disclosure.htm [https://perma.cc/K3
CX-LAKH]. After the attorney general’s Office grants an expungement, all official
records (and arrest records) will be ordered destroyed.
124 Id.
125 Doe, 110 F.3d at 454 n.16. Federal courts only have jurisdiction over
applications to expunge federal crimes.
126 See United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975).
127 See generally Sections II.B.1–2 (exploring the different approaches to
expungement across circuits.).
128 Linn, 513 F.2d at 926.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 926–27.
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courts have been of the view that the matter of expunging an
arrest record . . . was more appropriate for legislative action.”131
Most importantly, the court discussed instances in
which expungement was applied appropriately, such as where
the arrestee had been acquitted.132 Nevertheless, the court
detailed a careful scheme:
[T]he power to expunge an arrest record is a narrow one, and should
not be routinely used whenever a criminal prosecution ends in an
acquittal, but should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case.
Certain of the cases call for a “balancing” of the equities between the
Government’s need to maintain extensive records in order to aid in
general law enforcement and the individual’s right of privacy.133
In conclusion, the court held Linn’s fear of a possible privacy
invasion did not outweigh the “[g]overnment’s justification in
keeping the records.”134 Linn did not explicitly discuss the concept
of ancillary jurisdiction135 but it did conclude that Linn’s arrest
record did not fall under the narrow remedy of expungement.136
Two years after Linn, the Second Circuit considered the
issue of expungement of criminal records based upon equitable
considerations in United States v. Schnitzer.137 Schnitzer also
dealt with a motion to expunge an arrest record, not an actual
criminal conviction.138 Yet, in this case, the circuit court held
that the lower court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction
over Schnitzer’s expungement motion because, “[a] court, sitting
in a criminal prosecution, has ancillary jurisdiction to issue
protective orders regarding dissemination of arrest records.”139
Furthermore, the court defined the parameters of
expungement authority, noting that “expungement lies within
the equitable discretion of the court, and relief usually is granted
only in ‘extreme circumstances.’”140 The “extreme circumstances”
component can be determined if courts “consider[ ] the ‘delicate
131 Id. at 927.
132 Id. at 927–28.
133 Id. at 927.
134 Id. at 928.
135 Although the court concluded, “courts do possess the power to expunge an
arrest record.” Id. at 927.
136 Id. at 928.
137 United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1977).
138 Id. at 537. Specifically, Zalmon Schnitzer sought to expunge his arrest record,
as well as “secure the return of fingerprints and photographs, after dismissal of [his]
indictment.” Id.
139 Id. at 538 (citing Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740–41 (D.C.
Cir. 1969)). The court further concluded, “[t]he application of ancillary jurisdiction in this
case is proper and falls within the policy of encouraging judicial economy.” Id.
140 Id. at 539 (citing United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y.
1972)).
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balancing of the equities between the right of privacy of the
individual and the right of law enforcement official[s] to perform
their necessary duties.’”141 Even with this balancing, expungement
“should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case.”142
The court clarified specific instances of extreme
circumstances that may warrant expungement: mass arrest
situations where probable cause cannot be judicially determined;
arrests where the only purpose is to “harass civil rights workers”;
arrests where police misapply records that hurt the defendant;
and where “the arrest was proper but was based on a statute later
declared unconstitutional.”143 It is crucial to note that, ultimately,
the court found Schnitzer’s circumstances insufficient to warrant
expungement, and neither “harsh [nor] unique.”144 Essentially,
increased hardship to a person’s employment prospects, even
through the retention of a dismissed indictment, is not sufficient
to warrant expungement.145
More recently, a post-Kokkonen case in the Seventh
Circuit, United States v. Flowers,146 held that “district courts do
have jurisdiction to expunge records maintained by the judicial
branch.”147 Flowers relied on its own circuit’s precedent, rather
than Kokkonen, in coming to that conclusion.148 The Fourth
Circuit applied its precedential balancing test for expungement:
“if the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the
individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the
records, then expunction is appropriate.”149 More importantly,
the court in Flowers pointed out, “[a]lthough we have adopted a
balancing test, it seems clear that the balance very rarely tips
in favor of expungement.”150 Indeed, the court held true to this
141 Id. (citing Rosen, 343 F. Supp. at 806). The court noted the possible “serious
adverse consequences” that an arrest record can impose on an individual, including
economic and reputational losses. Id. (citing Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C.
Cir. 1970)).
142 Id. at 539–40 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975)).
143 Id. at 540.
144 Id. Schnitzer argued his arrest record was particularly detrimental to him
due to his rabbinical studies, which may require him to explain his arrest. However, the
Court disagreed, stating that “[s]uch an explanation may be expected from those about to
enter a profession.” Id.
145 Id.
146 Flowers sought to expunge her criminal conviction for “interfering with
housing right on account of race.” United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 738 (7th Cir.
2004). Flowers believed this conviction would hinder her employment in the healthcare
field. Id.
147 Id. at 739.
148 Id.
149 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d
470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993)). Janik appears to be decided a year before Kokkonen.
150 Id.
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standard in deciding that the district court improperly
expunged Flowers’ routine conviction with the “usual
attendant consequences.”151
Five circuit courts152 may have held that district courts
have the power to expunge criminal records based upon
equitable considerations,153 but they necessarily limited the
scope of expungement because it is difficult to find the extreme
circumstances expungement requires in cases where a person
faces ordinary employment discrimination.154
2. Circuits Denying Federal District Court Expungement
Courts in the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits155 properly held that district courts do not have
ancillary jurisdiction over equitable expungement applications.156
By denying the extension of ancillary jurisdiction over
expungement petitions, the above circuit courts, by implication,
endorse a narrow view of the expungement remedy. These circuits
cite a few central arguments in supporting this conclusion,
including the expungement remedy is limited by case law to
unlawful rights violations, the broad use of expungement can
annex the executive and legislative branch’s powers, and the
151 Id. at 740. Flowers, like others in circuit case precedent, did not allege an
actual loss of employment due to her conviction. Id. Rather she maintained employment
as a firefighter and also completed studies to become a nurse. Id. at 738.
152 As noted in Doe, five circuits (Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C.)
have (at one point) held that federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
expungement applications. Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 n.16 (E.D.N.Y.
2015). The case law of two circuits are not explained in detail in this note: United States
v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 2001) and Livingston v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 759
F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
153 The Fifth Circuit in Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee held that “[c]ourts
have supervisory powers over their own records,” but the issue of judicial expungement
was not up on appeal. Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695, 697 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit did, however, hold that the “district court lacked jurisdiction
over the defendant’s petition” to expunge executive branch records of his overturned wire
fraud conviction because he had not suffered a rights violation, which is necessary for the
court to consider granting expungement of executive branch records. Id. at 697–98.
154 Flowers, 389 F.3d at 739.
155 While other scholars have thoroughly analyzed federal expungement case
law (up until 2013) and argued for the expansion of expungement, this note outlines the
core arguments that the circuits have put forth, and highlights the common theme
throughout each side—that expungement is an extreme remedy. See Mukherji, supra
note 18, at 12–25. Circuit precedent has rightfully kept the scope of expungement limited;
the concealment of criminal records undermines the criminal justice process, and larger
scale expungement procedures to help certain individuals (exempting those who are
wrongfully convicted or convicted unconstitutionally) do not outweigh the importance of
the entire criminal record retention system.
156 Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 454 n.16. The most recent circuit to consider this
issue is the Second Circuit; a detailed discussion of that particular case will be
addressed infra Section II.C.
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underlying facts in an expungement application are not necessarily
intertwined with a prior criminal proceeding.157
In United States v. Lucido, the Sixth Circuit held the
district court lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s request to
expunge158 records of federal money-laundering charges for
which he was acquitted.159 The court in Lucido cited Kokkonen,
concluding that “the ancillary power of the federal courts does
not ‘stretch’ that ‘far.’”160 In recognizing district courts do not
have this inherent authority, the court also concluded an
important point that the key reasons Lucido gave for expunging
his record—namely, his good behavior and his employment—
have nothing to do with the prior criminal proceedings.161
The Sixth Circuit162 brilliantly summed up the
jurisdiction predicament while recognizing some of the
legitimate considerations Lucido has about his criminal record:
The equitable premise of Lucido’s motion after all is not illegitimate:
He claims to have gotten wrapped up unfairly in a criminal
prosecution eighteen years ago . . . . Why shouldn’t the federal courts
be able to clean the slate on decades-old indictments when fair-
minded reasons exist for doing so?
That the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
empowered only to wield power Congress and the Constitution has
given them, is one answer.163
157 See generally United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
similarly that the underlying facts in an expungement application are not necessarily
intertwined with a prior criminal proceeding); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.
2007) (concluding that the underlying facts in an expungement application are not
necessarily intertwined with a prior criminal proceeding); United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d
855 (8th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that allowing a district court to expunge criminal records
based on equitable circumstance would undermine the crucial importance of preserving
criminal records); United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
courts do not have jurisdiction to grant the expungement remedy for cases that end in valid
convictions); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the
expungement remedy is limited by case law to unlawful rights violations).
158 Lucido, 612 F.3d at 875. The Lucido court recognizes several statutes that do
permit expungement motions, id. at 874, but they are quite limited, as noted above in the
introduction. Among them are: the Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (2012)
(mentioned above), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2012) (authorizing district courts “to correct
inaccurate government records”), and 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (2012) (“authoriz[ing] the
expungement of DNA records”). Lucido, 612 F.3d at 874.
159 Id. at 872–73.
160 Id. at 874 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 379 (1994)).
161 Id. at 875.
162 The Sixth Circuit again recently affirmed its stance on jurisdiction in Lucido, in
United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 2014). The court held in Field, “[a]ncillary
jurisdiction over Field’s motion to expunge her record of arrest does not enable the district
court to vindicate its authority or effectuate its decrees because the district court did not
hold Field was illegally arrested.” Id. at 916.
163 Lucido, 612 F.3d at 877.
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Further reiterating the separation of powers argument noted in
Sumner, the court in Lucido also recognized that “[t]he power
to expunge an indictment is the power to undermine a web of
federal (and state) laws designed to collect and preserve such
information for law enforcement purposes.”164
In United States v. Sumner, the appellant requested
that his twenty-six-year-old unlawful possession of narcotics
conviction be expunged under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act,165 or “[i]n the alternative” be expunged by the district court
using “its ‘inherent powers under equitable principles.’”166 The
Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed Sumner’s167 argument that his
conviction should be set aside under the FYCA because the
district court record reflected that Sumner failed to comply
with “a condition of his sentence,” and therefore did not meet
the eligibility requirements under the FYCA.168 The Ninth
Circuit also held that district courts do not have the inherent
authority to expunge criminal records based on equitable
considerations, according to Kokkonen.169 The court held, “[i]n
our view, a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction is limited to
expunging the record of an unlawful arrest or conviction, or to
correcting a clerical error.”170 In support of its holding, the court
cautioned against a possible separation of powers violation,
concluding that expunging a valid conviction “usurps the
powers that the framers of the Constitution allocated to
Congress, the Executive, and the states.”171
In United States v. Meyer, the Eighth Circuit held the
district court—and similarly, the magistrate judge—lacked
jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record based on solely
equitable considerations where Meyer was convicted of failure
164 Id.
165 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1950) (repealed 1984).
166 United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1005).
167 In fact, Sumner was gainfully employed as a substitute teacher at the time of
the appeal. Id. He only wished to become a permanent teacher and thought that his
criminal record might preclude that, but there is nothing in the opinion to state definitively
that his position as a teacher would be denied due to the conviction. Id. at 1007–15.
168 Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1009.
169 Id. at 1010 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
375–77 (1994)). The court also cited its own decision in United States v. Smith to
demonstrate that since 1991, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court cannot expunge
a criminal conviction “without any finding or allegation that the convictions were
unconstitutional or in violation or statutory authority” based upon purely equitable
considerations. Id. at 1010 (quoting United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 395, 395 (9th Cir.
1991) (per curiam)). In fact, in Smith, the court recognized that “disbarment and a possible
prohibition against reenlistment” in the United States Army Reserves were “the natural
and intended collateral consequences of having been convicted.” Smith, 940 F.2d at 395.
170 Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014.
171 Id.
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to file income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203.172
Meyer feared that his employment in the securities industry
would be compromised due to his conviction because Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulations “restricted
the employment of individuals who had been convicted of
certain criminal offenses.”173 Without regard to this argument,
the court stated, “[w]e hold, as have the Ninth and Third
Circuits, that post-Kokkonen a motion to expunge a criminal
record that is based solely on equitable grounds does not
invoke . . . ancillary jurisdiction.”174
Soon thereafter, the Eighth Circuit addressed Meyer’s
apparent employment issue, stating, “[p]ermitting the
expungement of a record solely on equitable grounds would
interfere with state and federal laws that rely on the existence of
accurate and complete criminal records.”175 The court did not
believe that the narrow scope of the expungement remedy
extended to cover circumstances where a petitioner argued his
criminal record placed an inequitable burden on him.176
The First Circuit in United States v. Coloian,177
summarized the spectrum of precedent set forth above when it
concluded that based on Kokkonen, the district court did not
have ancillary jurisdiction over a petitioner’s motion to expunge
his acquittal on bribery charges.178 The court stated that the
stigma in the legal and business community Coloian might face
due to the record of his acquittal was not extreme or unusual,
and did not warrant expungement.179 Additionally, the court
reiterated that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in Coloian’s
case did not satisfy either Kokkonen condition to find ancillary
jurisdiction; Coloian’s current claim that the criminal acquittal
stigmatized his reputation was not interrelated to the original
facts in the criminal case, and the court did not require the power
to expunge to effectuate its decrees, such as Coloian’s acquittal.180
Ostensibly, according to the above circuits, most negative effects
on employment prospects resulting from criminal records will fall
outside the limited scope of the expungement remedy.
172 United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2006).
173 Id. at 856.
174 Id. at 860.
175 Id. at 862.
176 Id.
177 United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2007).
178 Id. at 48.
179 Id. at 49–52.
180 Id. at 52.
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C. The Current Situation—Doe and the Second Circuit
In August 2016, the Second Circuit decided the case of
Doe v. United States and distinguished its Schnitzer precedent
in holding that a district court does not have ancillary jurisdiction
over an expungement application that is solely based on equitable
circumstances.181 The appeal arose from Doe’s initial application
to the district court, seeking to expunge her 2001 health
insurance fraud conviction—which the district court granted
based upon a finding of ancillary jurisdiction over the application
and upon a finding that Doe’s situation warranted the narrow
remedy of expungement.182
Through an analysis of Doe’s arguments, the government’s
contention, the district court’s reasoning, and the Second Circuit’s
holding, it becomes clear that judicial expungement of criminal
records is not a viable route to aiding ex-offenders in their
transitions back into society.
1. Doe’s Employment Issue and District Court Case
In 2001, Doe was convicted in the Eastern District of
New York for committing health insurance fraud; Doe
participated in a scheme in which she got into a staged car
accident, received fake services from a complicit health care clinic
that later billed for these phony services, and recovered funds
from the health insurance company.183 In October of 2014, Doe
filed an application seeking to expunge her conviction because she
claimed it made it difficult for her to keep, as well as maintain,
jobs as a home health care aide.184
As Doe argued, and scholars note, one of the most
damning collateral consequences of having a criminal record is
the inability to maintain employment.185 In 2008, low employment
rates of ex-offenders contributed to an economic loss “between
181 Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 194–98 (2d Cir. 2016). As a summer
2015 intern at the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York
(Central Islip division), I worked closely with AUSA Bradley King, one of the AUSAs
assigned to the Doe case. During my tenure, I helped research and draft the initial
letter opposing the court’s May 2015 decision in favor of expungement, and I also
continued to work on the case for the duration of my internship.
182 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 457–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
183 Id. at 449–50.
184 Id. at 448–49.
185 See, e.g., Genevieve J. Miller, Comment, Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 119, 120–21
(2012); seeMouzon, supra note 17, at 1–2.
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$57 and $65 billion” in the United States.186 In Doe’s case, she
claims that employers hire her for various health care industry
jobs, and then subsequently fire her once they find out about her
criminal conviction during her background check.187 Although
the record does contain Doe’s assertion that employers refuse to
hire her when they discover her health care fraud conviction, the
record is unclear as to how many employers fired Doe for this
reason.188 Of the five employers listed in Doe’s probation file, only
one of them (from the record) clearly indicated that the reason for
her termination was her health care fraud conviction.189
In Doe, the district court conceded that employers are
allowed to know about prospective employee’s convictions and
also stated that “there will nevertheless be cases in which all
reasonable employers would conclude that the conviction is no
longer a meaningful consideration in determining suitability
for employment if only they had the time . . . to conduct a
thorough investigation.”190 Studies demonstrate that employment
discrimination against ex-offenders is a very real force; therefore,
the ability of an employer to conduct a thorough investigation
may not augment the potential for an ex-offender to gain
employment.191 And even if an employer completes a thorough
analysis of a job candidate, they may elect to hire a similarly
qualified candidate who does not possess a criminal conviction to
lessen the risk of liability or loss.192
The district court granted Doe’s expungement application
based on a finding of ancillary jurisdiction over the application
and on a finding that Doe’s situation warranted the narrow
remedy of expungement.193 In supporting this conclusion, the
court cited the long span of time that elapsed since Doe’s
conviction, her law-abiding behavior since the conviction, and the
negative effect Doe’s criminal conviction had on her employment
in the home health aide field.194 Relying primarily on the
employment hardship Doe faced, the court concluded, “[t]he
seemingly automatic refusals by judges to expunge convictions
186 JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, EX-
OFFENDERS AND THE LABORMARKET 1 (2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/
ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2HT-Q7AX].
187 Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 450–52.
188 Brief for the United States, supra note 120, at 5.
189 Id. at 6. The employer, Agency Five, stated there was a direct relationship
between Doe’s health care fraud conviction and the position she sought to obtain (home
health aide) in the health care field. Id.
190 Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 449.
191 See id.; JACOBS, supra note 2, at 279.
192 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 280.
193 Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 455–57.
194 Id. at 457.
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when the inability to find employment is the ‘only’ ground for
the application have undervalued the critical role employment
plays in re-entry.”195
On appeal, the government argued that based on circuit
case law, the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over
Doe’s expungement application, and the district court abused
its discretion by granting Doe’s expungement application.196
The government argued that although the Second Circuit in
Schnitzer held that district courts do have ancillary jurisdiction
over such motions, Schnitzer precedes Kokkonen; therefore, the
court should examine Kokkonen’s holding, and the circuit case
law after it to properly outline the boundaries of ancillary
jurisdiction.197 Because each circuit to consider the ancillary
jurisdiction issue—and to analyze it under Kokkonen—has
concluded that district courts do not have jurisdiction, the
government argued the Second Circuit should comply.198
The government further supported this argument with
two equally compelling justifications: expungement motions do
not factually rely on the underlying prosecution and expungement
motions do not allow a court to operate well.199 These two sub-
arguments stemmed from the blueprint of ancillary jurisdiction
elucidated in Kokkonen.200 Equitable expungement motions are
not a continuation of a criminal trial; rather, they are separate
applications that rest on separate facts that have occurred well
after a criminal prosecution has ended.201 In Doe’s case, the
court relied on the information surrounding the automobile
accident fraud scheme, not her probation record, which had not
even been created yet.202 An expungement application relies on
the facts about an ex-offender’s life after the criminal
conviction, not the facts of the initial case; in other words, the
expungement is not an extension of the case, and therefore the
jurisdiction cannot be either.203 Moreover, the government
argued that a district court’s power to preside over a criminal
case is not reliant upon whether or not it has power to make
that case disappear—to properly function, it is not
195 Id.
196 Brief for the United States, supra note 120, at 16–17.
197 Id. at 21.
198 Id. at 21–26.
199 Id. at 27–31.
200 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–80 (1994).
201 Brief for the United States, supra note 120, at 27–28.
202 Id. at 25–32.
203 Id. at 29–30.
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fundamental for criminal courts to be able to destroy the
records they create.204
Additionally, the government argued that the district
court abused its discretion in granting Doe’s expungement
motion.205 Notwithstanding the jurisdictional argument, the
Second Circuit, in Schnitzer, previously confined expungement
based on equitable considerations as a limited remedy when it
explained that expungement was only proper in extraordinary
circumstances.206 Although the District Court for the Southern
District of New York did grant expungement applications for a
few select defendants who were convicted under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, no other federal district courts have
granted expungement motions based solely on a criminal
conviction’s adverse employment impact.207 Therefore, the
government argued that this consequence does not fall under the
“extreme circumstances” warranting expungement.208
Conversely, Doe argued that Schnitzer and Kokkonen
support a finding of ancillary jurisdiction and that the district
court “acted within its discretion” in granting Doe’s application.209
Doe contended that Kokkonen’s precedent does not disturb the
holding in Schnitzer, and that district courts do have ancillary
jurisdiction over expungement motions because “district courts
retain a ‘reservoir of jurisdiction . . . to entertain motions after
final judgment.’”210 The fact that all of the circuit courts to
address the ancillary jurisdiction question since Kokkonen (and
rely on Kokkonen’s holding) have held that district courts lack
jurisdiction over expungement motions is a nonissue to Doe,
who claimed that “there was no need for those cases to address
it.”211 Doe further argued that the district court’s exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction was proper because Doe’s criminal conviction
and expungement motion are factually interdependent, and the
jurisdiction allows the court to vindicate its sentencing decree.212
Doe asserted that the court had to look back to her conviction
while deciding her expungement motion.213
204 Id. at 30 (citing United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 875 (6th Cir. 2010)).
205 Id. at 33.
206 Id. at 36.
207 Id. at 38–40.
208 Id. at 42–43 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith,
940 F.2d 395, 396 (9th Cir. 1991)).
209 Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 10–33, Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192
(2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1967-cr).
210 Id. at 12 (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 467 F.3d
785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
211 Id. at 22.
212 Id. at 23, 27.
213 Id. at 24.
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Noting that the “abuse of discretion” standard is
deferential to the district court, Doe concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the expungement
motion.214 Citing the court’s particularly close review of Doe’s
case file and probation record, Doe argued that the court
uncovered a specific harm (specific instances of failure to secure
a job based upon her conviction) that properly outweighed the
government’s need to maintain accurate criminal records.215
2. The Second Circuit’s Holding
The Second Circuit held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Doe’s expungement motion.216 The court
addressed the arguments in support of a finding of ancillary
jurisdiction, beginning with the Schnitzer precedent.217 In the
court’s view, Schnitzer applies only to the expungement of
arrest records after a court order of dismissal, not conviction
records without an order of dismissal.218 Moreover, the court
held that neither of Kokkonen’s defined purposes of ancillary
jurisdiction (to permit disposition of factually interdependent
claims, and “to enable a court to . . . vindicate its authority, and
effectuate its decrees”) supported a finding of ancillary
jurisdiction in the present case.219 The Second Circuit concluded
that the district court’s decree “long since expired by the time
Doe filed her motion” and the facts supporting the grant of
Doe’s expungement motion were based on events “that
transpired years after her sentencing.”220 The court noted that
the decision to expand judicial jurisdiction lies in the hands of
Congress, and until they decide to extend it, ex-offenders will
not be able to pursue expungement through the courts.221 This
recent holding may prove persuasive in other circuit courts
going forward, and may further prevent expungement from
becoming an accessible remedy in federal court.
214 Id. at 37–38.
215 Id. at 37–40.
216 Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2016).
217 Id. at 195–96.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 195–97 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994)).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 198.
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3. Why Expungement Was Not Effective in Doe’s Case
As Doe’s record indicates, a person’s employment
history is not always straightforward.222 Criminal convictions
certainly increase the risk of employment discrimination, but
expungement of those records may not be the best answer.223
Even if a criminal conviction is expunged from an ex-offender’s
judicial record, the court cannot erase traces of the conviction
from all social media, print, or otherwise.224 A simple Google
search would still return news stories, if any, about a criminal
case. Moreover, the court cannot forbid former employers from
speaking with prospective employers concerning a candidate,
nor can it ask all those who know about an ex-offender’s
conviction to lie about it, if asked.225 Even if the Second Circuit did
affirm Doe’s expungement order, a new prospective health care
aide employer might not find Doe’s health care fraud conviction
through a paid background check, but the conviction could very
well be revealed if the employer called Doe’s Agency as a
reference. This reality ultimately strengthens the premise that
the judicial remedy of expungement is not a sufficient solution to
the myriad of problems ex-offenders face upon release.
III. WHY THE TRUE PROVERBIAL CLEAN SLATE ISNOT
ATTAINABLE
As James B. Jacobs recently quoted in his book, The
Eternal Criminal Record, “[r]ecord concealment is unworkable.”226
After unfolding the history and case law regarding expungements
based on equitable considerations,227 it is apparent that the
expungement remedy is unsuccessful at the federal level. The
remainder of this note will dispute the usefulness of federal
judicial and legislative expungement228 through practical and
philosophical lenses.
222 See Brief for the United States, supra note 120, at 5.
223 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 120–28.
224 Id. at 121.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 113 (quoting Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery Jr., Sealing and
Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 378, 383 (1970)).
227 See supra Parts I, II.
228 Although some of the case law discussed in this note involved the expungement
of arrest records and criminal acquittals, the arguments set forth in Part III are applicable
to the expungement of criminal convictions based upon equitable considerations. This note
does not comment on the expungement of those acquitted or wrongfully convicted.
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A. Federal District Courts Currently Lack the Authority to
Grant Expungement Motions and Expungement Is Not
Uniform Throughout the Circuits
Without a conclusive consensus in circuit case law on
whether or not district courts can grant expungement motions
based on equitable considerations, the expungement remedy is
not a widely viable option for most ex-offenders.229 Although the
Second Circuit’s Doe precedent is not binding in other circuits,
it may be persuasive.
Moreover, even if federal judicial expungement based on
equitable considerations becomes an option for ex-offenders in
some circuits, this traditionally narrow remedy will be
unavailable to many ex-offenders.230 Those ex-offenders with
convictions for violent felonies,231 or convictions that are not as
remote in time as Doe’s conviction, will still be precluded from
seeking the expungement remedy.232 If an individual ex-
offender’s conviction is expunged, and she is not the only
defendant in the prior criminal case, the proper convictions of
other individuals that are not entitled to expungement may
nevertheless become sealed.233 In that scenario, the court will
keep records of the underlying criminal proceeding confidential
and they will not be open to the public.234 This can lead to an
overinclusive effect of expungement whereby ex-offenders who
did not petition for expungement may nevertheless receive some
privacy benefit from the codefendant’s petition.235 Therefore,
federal judicial expungement is not an accurate tool for the
reduction of employment discrimination against all ex-offenders
because it may include some ex-offenders (codefendants) who do
not meet the stringent standards, yet also may exclude some
seemingly deserving ex-offenders who do not have extreme
enough circumstances.236
229 For a more recent case that limits the expungement remedy, yet discusses
the desirability of granting such motions, see generally Stephenson v. United States,
139 F. Supp. 3d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
230 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 455–57 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
231 See infra Section III.C for an explanation of violent versus nonviolent
offender expungement arguments.
232 Jacobs addresses the need to allow the expungement remedy closer in time
to the conviction, however, he also notes that some current expungement schemes
demand a waiting period before the remedy is available. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 131.
233 See Brief for the United States, supra note 120, at 13–14.
234 ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALING COURT RECORDS
AND PROCEEDINGS: A POCKETGUIDE 1–2 (2010).
235 See generally Brief for the United States, supra note 120, at 13–14. If the
district court’s order stood, the thirty-seven other codefendants might have had their
criminal records sealed, thereby benefitting from Doe’s expungement. See id.
236 See Kessler, supra note 17, at 410–15.
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B. The Practical Obstacles to Erasing a Criminal Record
There are significant practical obstacles to using
expungement as a means to rehabilitate ex-offenders and aid
their the transition back into society.237 Just eight years ago,
73% of employers that responded to a survey required a criminal
background check for all hires.238 In fact, commercial information
vendors such as HireRight and ChoicePoint advertise their
services by “warning employers about the risks of failing to
screen job applicants and incumbent employees properly.”239
The prominence of the public dissemination of criminal
records impacts the efficacy of expungement as a tool to combat
negative collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.240 A
federal court, if properly exercising jurisdiction, can order a
criminal conviction to be expunged, but there are limitations to its
power.241 The court cannot completely discard the online presence
a criminal conviction may have, including Google search terms,
mug shot websites, background check company data storage, and
background check dating websites.242 Furthermore, keeping
criminal records of convictions from the public eye cannot stop
the public from viewing criminal trials nor stop the press from
reporting about them.243 Additionally, constitutional protections
such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press make it
impossible for the judicial or legislative branches to stop media
outlets from commenting on criminal convictions or to erase
previous stories on a conviction.244 Suggestions such as creating a
separate criminal record database within public records to avoid
the issue of open-records laws245 still do not resolve the issue of
third party dissemination of information concerning a criminal
conviction.246 For example, Colorado has a separate statute that
applies to the public access of criminal records—CCJRA.247
237 See Love, supra note 13, at 755, 759.
238 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 6.
239 Id. at 71–72.
240 See Love, supra note 13, at 755, 759.
241 JACOBS supra note 2, at 121.
242 See generally Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the
Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV 321 (2015) (providing a comprehensive argument as to
why expungement is a difficult remedy in the modern technology age).
243 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 121.
244 Id.
245 Open Records Laws and Resources, JUDICIAL WATCH, http://www.judicial
watch.org/open-records-laws-and-resources/ [https://perma.cc/9UPE-AXFH]. Open records
laws allow for public access to government records to combat against corrupt behavior. Id.
246 See Kessler, supra note 17, at 441.
247 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-304(1) (2016); COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COAL.
LEGAL PROGRAM, COLORADO OPEN RECORDS ACT AND COLORADO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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Criminal justice records may be requested “at the discretion of
the official custodian [a state bureaucrat].”248 Again, this
“custodian” barrier will not prevent third party dissemination of
information concerning a criminal conviction, it is not implemented
at the federal level (for federal convictions), and some criticize the
statute as a restrictive open-records law.249
Countries outside the United States250 that value an
individual’s privacy over the public’s access to criminal records
tend to have broader expungement processes and greater
protections for the dissemination of criminal records.251 For
example, in Australia, it is “a crime to disclose an expunged
conviction.”252 In Spain, criminal trial verdicts are typically not
read “in open court,” and published opinions are anonymous,
giving the defendant increased privacy.253 Employers in Germany
are not allowed to obtain an applicant’s criminal record, but “if a
specific type of criminal propensity would be incompatible with
carrying out a particular job’s duties successfully” the employer
may inquire about it.254 The aforementioned policies are
inconsistent with the present federal approach in the United
States; the public can retrieve federal court records through the
internet and PACER.255 Likewise, America’s culture dogma—
uncovering the intimate details of a person’s life (just look at any
headline of a magazine)—conflicts with the important notions of
privacy protected by other countries.256 In the modern United
States, policy and procedure make it incredibly difficult for the
expungement of criminal records to be effective.
RECORDS ACT (2013), http://www.ccdconline.org/sites/default/files/colorado_open_
records_act_info.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CEU-26ZR].
248 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-304(1) (2016).
249 See, e.g., Christopher N. Osher, Colorado Gets Grade of F for Its Open-
Records Laws, DENVER POST (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/11/11/
colorado-gets-grade-of-f-for-its-open-records-laws/ [https://perma.cc/E4ZF-KMEE].
250 Such as Spain, France, and Germany. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 119 &
n.*–20, 192.
251 Id. at 192.
252 Id. at 121 n.*.
253 Id. at 164.
254 Id. at 276 n.*.
255 Id. at 57. PACER is the federal courts’ record system. Id. On PACER, anyone
can access indictments, pre-trial motions, briefs, and opinions for criminal cases after
1999. Id.
256 Roberts, supra note 242, at 321–22; Constance Gustke, Which Countries
Are Better at Protecting Privacy, CAPITAL (June 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/capital/
story/20130625-your-private-data-is-showing [https://perma.cc/Z746-7P2Z].
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C. Congress Has Failed to Pass Comprehensive Federal
Expungement Legislation
As of April 2017, Congress has not passed any extensive
federal expungement legislation.257 The House of Representatives
previously proposed variations of the REDEEM Act—the current
federal expungement legislation being considered by the
Committee on the Judiciary—known as the “Second Chance for
Ex-Offenders Act” in 2000, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011.258 The
REDEEM Act attempts to seal the criminal records of some
nonviolent offenders.259 Without considerable support from both
parties, the currently proposed expungement legislation is not
an adequate solution to the employment barriers ex-offenders
face because it only grants expungement to a limited number of
ex-offenders, and it still cannot overcome the practical obstacles
facing expungement discussed supra Section III.B.260
As one critic pointed out, the current REDEEM Act
proposal severely limits the number of ex-offenders who can even
benefit from the plan.261 Without diving into exact statistics, the
Collateral Consequences Resource Center (CCRC)262 notes that
“many deserving individuals” with so-called “violent” federal rap
sheets will fail to take advantage of this law if it ever even comes
to fruition.263 The CCRC takes particular issue with the
distinction the REDEEM Act draws between violent and
nonviolent offenses.264 Beyond the fact that the law limits
expungement to certain classes of ex-offenders, the CCRC argues
that the process of delineating which offenses are violent and
nonviolent is ambiguous.265 Although subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16—the statute that determines which crimes are crimes of
257 Mukherji, supra note 18, at 26; see REDEEM Act, H.R. 1672, 114th
Cong. (2015).
258 See Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2011, H.R. 2065, 112th Cong.
(2011); Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2009, H.R. 1529, 111th Cong. (2009); Second
Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2007, H.R. 623, 110th Cong. (2007); Second Chance for Ex-
Offenders Act of 2005, H.R. 662, 109th Cong. (2005); Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of
2000, H.R. 5433, 106th Cong. (2000).
259 REDEEM Act, H.R. 1672, 114th Cong. (2015).
260 Why Should Expungement Be Limited to “Nonviolent” Crimes?, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/07/29/should-
violent-convictions-be-expunged-why-the-redeem-act-eligibility-provisions-should-be-ame
nded/ [https://perma.cc/S4YN-74D2].
261 Id.
262 The Collateral Consequences Resource Center is a nonprofit organization
that “promote[s] public discussion of the collateral consequences of conviction.” About Us,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org/about-the-collateral-
consequences-resource-center/ [https://perma.cc/F4M8-D6YU].
263 Why Should Expungement Be Limited to “Nonviolent” Crimes?, supra note 260.
264 Id.
265 Id.
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violence—is rather straightforward,266 the application of
subsection (b) (that enumerates further “violent” crimes) is not
completely clear for two reasons: (1) the Supreme Court has yet
to decide “whether a crime falls within the definition of § 16 (b)
[i.e., whether or not it is a felony]” and; (2) the task itself of
determining whether an offense “involves a substantial risk
that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing
the offense” is not entirely objective.267 For example, what is the
threshold for “substantial risk” of physical force in an extortion
case? Moreover, this violent versus nonviolent paradigm begs
the question: Do we believe that only nonviolent ex-offender
traits are capable of being rehabilitated?268
Countries with more aggressive expungement policies,
and actual expungement legislation, still encounter the decision
of which crimes to exclude from the expungement remedy.269
England appears to embrace countrywide legislation to aid ex-
offenders in finding employment.270 According to England’s
Ministry of Justice, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of 1974
“exists to support the rehabilitation into employment of reformed
offenders who have stayed on the right side of the law.”271 One
major exception to the Act, which precludes many ex-offenders
from its benefit, is the clause that, “[a]ll cautions and convictions
eventually become spent [once an offender has met certain
criteria], with the exception of prison sentences of over 30
months (2 ½ years).”272 Additionally, although the Act essentially
erases, or turns convictions into spent convictions, it does
caution that there are exceptions where an ex-offender may still
have to disclose his prior conviction.273 These exceptions include
applying for employment working with “children and vulnerable
266 According to the REDEEM Act, to determine whether a crime is violent or
nonviolent, one must look to 18 U.S.C. § 16, which provides:
The term “crime of violence” means—(a) an offense that has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
267 See id.
268 Why Should Expungement Be Limited to “Nonviolent” Crimes?, supra note 260
(stating that the REDEEM Act’s limitation to nonviolent crimes “invit[es] endless wrangling
over which particular individuals are deserving”).
269 See, e.g., Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, c. 53 (Eng.).
270 Id.
271 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 1, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/216089/rehabilitation-offenders.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV
R3-EDGZ].
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1–2.
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adults,” law enforcement, the legal system, “and high level
financial positions.”274 Exceptions may also apply to obtaining
certain licenses.275 In light of all of these exceptions to this
admirable act, it appears that the same issues come to the
forefront in England with regard to expungement of criminal
records. Although the Act attempts to erase prior convictions, it
does so in limited circumstances,276 which will not aid all ex-
offenders.277 Even the ex-offenders the Act does purport to help
must succumb to the Act’s exceptions, which are not limited in
scope, and may threaten to exclude many ex-offenders who
otherwise qualify.278 Ultimately, legislation must pick and choose
whom to forgive, and past proposals, such as the REDEEM Act,
still succumb to this realization.
D. Synergizing the Philosophies of Punishment and the
Criminal Justice System with Expungement
When considering whether to implement expungement,
both judicially or legislatively, one should consider the philosophy
behind criminal punishment and how those policies interact with
the expungement solution proposed by other scholars.279 The
consideration of two prominent philosophical schools of thought,
retributivism and utilitarianism, facilitates a discussion of the
purpose of punishment, the purpose of recording criminal
punishment, and whether erasing such records conflicts with the
goals of punishment.280
Proponents of the retributive theory of punishment argue
that the government should punish all people who do wrong
because justice demands payback.281 A retributivist believes that
offenders possess free will, and since they commit crimes
purposefully, an offender must, in turn, receive a purposeful
negative punishment to correct the imbalance of wrongdoing.282
Vindicating the harm an offender inflicts on society may feel like
a natural response—an ingrained social tit-for-tat—for doing
274 Id. at 2.
275 Id.
276 Remember, the limitation on convictions over two-and-a-half years.
277 SeeMINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 271, at 2.
278 See id.
279 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 210 (Retribution remains a central goal of
punishment within the criminal justice system.).
280 See id. at 210–11; Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1896 n.71 (1991).
281 MARK TUNICK, PUNISHMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE 67–69 (1992), http://
publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft4q2nb3dn&chunk.id=d0e2384&brand=u
cpress [https://perma.cc/JWE2-A6R7].
282 Massaro, supra note 280, at 1891–92.
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something wrong in the first place.283 This may explain why this
theory of punishment finds marked support in the American
criminal justice system.284
If the creation of a criminal record itself is a permanent
part of an offender’s punishment,285 then it becomes harder to
justify expunging it.286 Of course, there may always be individuals
who do not care whether they have a criminal record, and in that
case, it will not matter whether their records are expunged.287
Even if a criminal record is not part of an offender’s punishment
(for example, if a retributivist deemed imprisonment the only
punishment), there is still a legitimate purpose in retaining
criminal records to “promot[e] effective law enforcement.”288
At variance with retributivism is utilitarianism, which
argues that the government should only punish to augment
social utility overall.289 This theory suggests that an offender
should be punished to the extent that the punishment will
actually deter negative behavior and therefore eliminate negative
consequences to society.290 The question becomes, does the
creation of a criminal record deter an offender from committing
future crimes?291 If a person fears the repercussions of the public
knowing she committed a crime, then using a criminal record as a
method of punishment may work.292 The counter argument to this
proposition is that the collateral consequences of a criminal record
far exceed the intended deterrence effect and punishment.293
Expungement is not the only solution to correcting the deleterious
effects of collateral consequences,294 and other justifiable uses of
283 See id.
284 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 210 (stating that since the mid-1970s, retribution
has been the “dominant justification for punishment in the United States”).
285 Id. at 211.
286 Id. at 212–13.
287 See generally GOODFELLAS (Warner Bros. 1990). Of course, this is a
fictional account, but consider the following quote:
For us to live any other way [without a life of criminal activity] was nuts. Uh,
to us, those goody-good people who worked shitty jobs for bum paychecks and
took the subway to work every day, and worried about their bills, were dead.
I mean, they were suckers. . . . If we wanted something, we just took it.
Id.
288 United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977).
289 See Jocelyn M. Pollock, The Rationale for Imprisonment, in PRISONS TODAY
AND TOMORROW 5–6 (Jocelyn M. Pollock ed., 2d ed. 2006).
290 See id. at 5.
291 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 216–17.
292 Id. at 217–18.
293 Silva, supra note 15, at 164–45.
294 See Love, supra note 13, at 753–55 (advocating for a holistic alteration of
the current criminal justice system, including sentencing and relief mechanisms for ex-
offender reentry into employment).
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criminal records caution against expungement, such as the use of
criminal records “as an investigative tool.”295
Margaret Colgate Love, a preeminent scholar of collateral
consequences, argued for the forgiveness for ex-offenders.296
Although some may argue that expungement is compatible with
the philosophy of forgiveness and rehabilitation,297 expungement
also implicates the notion of forgetting. For an ex-offender to truly
be rehabilitated, society must not only forgive but also “forget”
that the offense occurred, otherwise the fact that an offense
occurred will continue to permeate that person’s identity and
societal prospects. There are also legitimate reasons why
employers may need access to criminal records, such as
eliminating risks ex-offender employees may pose to customers or
reducing liability in potential negligent hiring suits.298 As
previously stated,299 completely forgetting the existence of a
federal criminal record is not a feasible reality and conflicts with
important components of our current criminal justice system.300
IV. THE SOLUTION—FORGOING THEOUTRIGHT EXPANSION
OF FEDERAL EXPUNGEMENT ANDDEALING WITH THE
MODERNDAY REALITIES IN A PRACTICALMANNER
Arguably, even a limited form of expungement—as
advocated in some of the aforementioned circuit cases—would
succumb to the practical difficulties of erasing all public and
private records of criminal activity. Therefore, this section
advocates for a combined approach: the use of certificates of
rehabilitation and increased tax incentives to aid ex-offenders
with the collateral consequences they face. In Doe v. United
States, Judge Gleeson recognized the emergent public cognizance
of the negative collateral consequences associated with criminal
convictions: “There is an increasing awareness that continuing to
marginalize people like Doe does much more harm than good.”301
Nonetheless, relatively recent studies demonstrate that employers
continue to discriminate against job applicants with criminal
records.302 This impacts all ex-offenders, whether or not they may
pose a real liability to prospective employers. Until a majority of
295 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE ANDMANAGEMENT OF CRIMINALHISTORY RECORD
INFORMATION: ACOMPREHENSIVEREPORT 14 (1993).
296 Love, supra note 13, at 753–54.
297 Id. at 759.
298 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 277–78.
299 See supra Section III.B.
300 See supra Sections III.A–B, III.D.
301 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 457–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
302 SCHMITT&WARNER, supra note 186, at 9–11.
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society transforms the way they view ex-offenders, negative
collateral consequences of criminal convictions will remain a part
of the criminal justice system.303 Changing a person’s perspective
on any topic can be challenging. The pervasive application of
criminal law in the United States also makes it difficult to remedy
the unintended result of criminal convictions—collateral
consequences.304 To alter the output of the criminal justice system
(collateral consequences), one might suggest reforming the input
of the criminal justice (reduce prosecutions for certain crimes and
reclassify certain crimes).305 There is no single solution to the
problem of collateral consequences, just as there is no singular
issue arising from collateral consequences.306 To address the issue
of employment discrimination against ex-offenders, the federal
government should (1) implement the use of federal certificates of
rehabilitation and (2) increase employer tax incentives to hire ex-
offenders.
A. Certificates of Rehabilitation
Rather than pursuing federal judicial expungement of
criminal convictions, the federal government can issue certificates
of rehabilitation (COR).307 A certificate of rehabilitation “places [a]
prior conviction in a more favorable light” and reveals that an ex-
offender has not committed any further offenses.308 States have
carried out different forms of certificates of rehabilitation, with
varied success.309 After considering New York’s scheme for
certificates of rehabilitation as an example, this section will present
a basic proposal for a federal program, taking into account some of
the critiques and issues surrounding certificate programs.310 It is
unlikely that the federal government can force all states to
303 Love, supra note 13, at 755–56.
304 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 94 (arguing that overcriminalization in the
United States has resulted in “an immense population of persons with criminal records”);
see also Roberts, supra note 242, 325–37.
305 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 95–97. This would entail recategorizing some
felonies as misdemeanors and some misdemeanors as criminal violations.
306 See generally Kessler, supra note 17 (strategically highlighting such
consequences as difficulty maintaining employment and securing housing).
307 See generally RECOMMENDATION 103E (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (recommending
certificates of rehabilitation in the 2007 Recommendation).
308 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 127.
309 Eleven states experimented with issuing variations of certificates. Id.;
MARGARET LOVE & APRIL FRAZIER, AM. BAR ASS’N, CERTIFICATES OF REHABILITATION AND
OTHERFORMS OFRELIEF FROM THECOLLATERALCONSEQUENCES OFCONVICTION: A SURVEY
OFSTATELAWS 2 (2006).
310 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 127–28.
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implement a certificate of rehabilitation program,311 however,
states may consider adopting similar regimes once the federal
government imposes a legitimate COR program of its own.
Admittedly, federalism and state sovereignty create vast
difficulties in imposing a COR regime on states, but the creation
of a federal COR system that can potentially relieve collateral
consequences of those convicted of federal crimes is better than
declining to experiment with any program. With a dearth of
curative policies for ex-offenders, it is advantageous to
implement a procedure to augment the fight against collateral
consequences and to prevent against recidivism. Perhaps the
federal government can additionally provide funding incentives
to states who decide to adopt a COR program comparable to the
federal COR program proposed below.
Moreover, some states already implemented COR
programs of their own and can also serve as additional models
to fellow states. In New York, an ex-offender can be eligible for
one of two certificates: a certificate of relief from disabilities or
a certificate of good conduct.312 A certificate of relief from
disabilities is open to “misdemeanants and first-time felony
offenders,” while a certificate of good conduct is open to offenders
with more than one felony conviction.313 In similar fashion, the
certificate of relief from disabilities is available immediately
after sentencing from either the court or the parole board,
whereas a certificate of good conduct involves a waiting period of
one to five years before availability and is granted only by the
parole board.314 Both forms of the certificate “relieve an eligible
person of ‘any forfeiture or disability,’ and ‘remove any barrier
to . . . employment that is automatically imposed by law by
reason of conviction.’”315 These certificates are actual documents
that may alleviate some of the negative consequences of a
conviction by providing evidence to an employer or licensing
agency that an ex-offender has been rehabilitated.316 COR
programs in places like New York have recently seen increased
311 See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the
federal government cannot commandeer states to implement federal programs, specifically
portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act).
312 LOVE& FRAZIER, supra note 309, at 3.
313 Id.
314 Id.; JACOBS, supra note 2, at 128–29.
315 LOVE& FRAZIER, supra note 309, at 3 (omission in original).
316 See LEGAL ACTION CTR., LOWERING CRIMINAL RECORD BARRIERS:
CERTIFICATES OFRELIEF/GOODCONDUCT ANDRECORD SEALING 19 (2014).
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success, with support from public aid attorneys to execute the
process, and accompanying anti-discrimination legislation.317
In March 2016, before he left the bench, Judge Gleeson
issued a certificate of rehabilitation to a woman he previously
sentenced based on the belief that the woman’s lawful record since
her conviction deemed her rehabilitated.318 In the “influential”
ruling, Judge Gleeson discussed the difference between the
“forgetting” model of expungement and the “forgiveness” model
that his certificate of rehabilitation exhibits, and he concluded
that a COR “can significantly alleviate the collateral effects of a
criminal record by emitting a powerful signal that the same
system that found a person deserving of punishment has now
found that individual fit to fully rejoin the community.”319 Judge
Gleeson cited state examples of COR programs.320
Employers might find a federal certificate of
rehabilitation321 program more credible than individual states’
certificate plans (and therefore the program may gain more
recognition) due to the unified national reach a federal program
could have. Since a federal COR program would have to be
created by the legislature even if it is carried out by the federal
courts,322 and since federal expungement legislation has continually
failed to gain widespread support,323 an initial proposal for a COR
program should be straightforward, yet robust.324 A federal COR
program may have an easier time getting through Congress than
expungement legislation because COR legislation would not be
“rewriting history.”325
Unlike the New York COR program, a federal COR
system should begin with offering one form of certificate relief
that does not directly discriminate based upon the type of
conviction326 but rather grants federal judges (rather than a parole
317 Certificates of Rehabilitation Can Help Promote Successful Re-Entry
Outcomes, AM. PRISON DATA SYS. (May 31, 2016), http://apdscorporate.com/certificates-
of-rehabilitation-can-help-promote-successful-re-entry-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/2NGV-
D8R8]; Eli Hager, Forgiving vs. Forgetting, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/17/forgiving-vs-forgetting#.3CqVrcvi5 [https://
perma.cc/Y8K2-KPK3].
318 Margaret Love, Judge Gleeson Issues a “Federal Certificate of Rehabilitation”,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Mar. 7, 2016), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/03/
07/judge-gleeson-issues-a-federal-certificate-of-rehabilitation/ [https://perma.cc/J6TE-JJZ7].
319 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 455–57 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
320 Id.
321 This section is referring to the use of a federal COR program for federal crimes.
322 See Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid a Report
Card on the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 21 CRIM. JUST. 16, 22 (2006).
323 See supra Section III.C.
324 See, e.g., Love, supra note 322, at 22.
325 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 130.
326 Although, similar to presently proposed expungement legislation, an initial
COR proposal will most likely have to include some type of a violent versus nonviolent
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board) discretion in awarding a certificate.327 To keep the program
transparent to ex-offenders and the public in general, the system
should contain the following guidelines: ex-offenders must apply
themselves for the COR, but either the court or probation office
must notify the offender of the existence of the program;328
certificates should be granted upon a holistic review of an
offender’s probation file, but certificates are only available to
those ex-offenders who have not been re-arrested since his or her
last sentence; ex-offenders can apply for a COR upon completion
of their sentence; COR can be revoked if an offense is committed
after receipt; and employers must review a COR in addition to a
criminal record if they are completing a background check.329
Under the proposed federal COR legislation, Congress
could give federal district courts and federal magistrate judges
authority to issue CORs.330 Judicial oversight of CORs would
bolster the credibility of the program because judges could
begin to discern those applicants who truly earned a COR; it
has been noted that if everyone receives a COR, employers may
deem them worthless.331 The costs associated with COR
applications may be less than the costs associated with
expungement applications based on equitable considerations
because United States attorney offices might oppose COR
applications less than expungement motions.332 United States
Attorneys could be open to CORs, rather than expungement
petitions, because CORs would not unravel the purpose of
criminal prosecution, nor hide a criminal conviction; therefore,
less money would be spent on the appeals process of an
expungement application.333
To strengthen the efficacy of a federal COR program,
legislation should provide for an avenue for ex-offenders to seek
distinction when it comes to eligibility. Why Should Expungement Be Limited to
“Nonviolent” Crimes?, supra note 260. Unlike the currently proposed expungement
legislation, a COR proposal could clearly identify the specific crimes ineligible for
rehabilitation, such as murder or violent rape. Id.
327 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 127–29 (discussing state law procedures for
expungement).
328 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 307, at 5.
329 See LEGAL ACTION CTR. NAT’L H.I.R.E. NETWORK, RECOMMENDED KEY
PROVISIONS FOR CERTIFICATE OF REHABILITATION LEGISLATION, https://lac.org/toolkits/
certificates/Key%20Provisions%20-%20Certificates.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T9A-DGNG].
330 Since magistrate judges handle “most petitions by prisoners for review of their
convictions” is it plausible that they may also preside over COR applications. See Questions
and Answers About Magistrate Judges, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF UTAH, http://
www.utd.uscourts.gov/judges/qa_magjudge.html [https://perma.cc/RFN3-S5K9].
331 Hager, supra note 317.
332 See Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 571–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
333 See generally id.; JACOBS, supra note 2, at 130 (Jacobs and Judge Dearie
recognize the resistance to expungement due to the concealment of potentially important
public information.).
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redress if employers discriminate against those with a COR.
New York’s Article 23A prohibits unfair discrimination against
persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses
(with certain exceptions and limitations).334 It would likely be
difficult to pass legislation on the federal level of the same
nature.335 Instead, federal legislation could at least mandate the
use of a COR in a federal employment discrimination case as
presumptive evidence of discrimination if the employer chose to
hire a similarly situated candidate over the ex-offender and the
ex-offender possessed a COR. This proposal would balance the
need to strengthen the practice of the COR program with an
employer’s need to effectively hire employees. If an ex-offender
with a COR consistently faces similar challenges when applying
for jobs, and recognizes that a person with the same qualifications
is hired over the ex-offender, the ex-offender may pursue a claim
as long as there is no other legitimate reason for the employer to
hire the other candidate.336
Lastly, to ensure prospective employers know about the
COR, an independent federal database for COR recipients should
be created—like the PACER system.337 Proper notification of
accurate criminal records is an issue;338 to alleviate any issues
that may arise with federal CORs, federal legislation should
require background check companies to provide evidence of where
an ex-offender possesses a COR if they are also providing
evidence of a criminal record. Furthermore, if employers decide to
ask about a criminal record, there should be a box where
prospective employees can check a rehabilitated status in addition
to checking a box that indicates they have a criminal record. The
phenomena of the “ban the box” proposal, whereby employers are
prohibited from asking about prospective employees’ criminal
history on a job application, thereby delaying a background check
inquiry until later in the hiring process, shows support for
increasing ex-offender hiring prospects.339 If a federal COR is
334 Certificates of Rehabilitation Can Help Promote Successful Re-Entry
Outcomes, supra note 317.
335 See Tammy R. Pettinato, Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders:
The Promise and Limits of Title VII Disparate Impact Theory, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 831, 835–
40 (2014) (pointing out that employers may have legitimate reasons to be concerned about
liability when hiring ex-offenders—this may explain why there is a lack of federal
legislation as a supreme directive eliminating employment discrimination against ex-
offenders).
336 This is by no means a comprehensive consideration of employment
discrimination law, but a mere possibility to bolster a federal COR program.
337 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 132.
338 See id.; Kessler, supra note 17, at 441.
339 MICHELLENATIVIDADRODRIGUEZ&BETHAVERY, NAT’LEMP’T LAW PROJECT,
BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANGE POLICIES TO
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established, there may be a similar movement in the employment
arena. Although adding a COR box would not prevent
employers from knowing upfront about criminal records (which
is an argument against ban the box—it merely delays the flow
of information, but does not prevent it entirely),340 it would
perhaps provide a way to track whether or not employers are
discriminating against ex-offenders. Employers would know
upfront about a person’s rehabilitated status and therefore
have less of a defense against an employment discrimination
claim if they hire a similar candidate without a criminal record
or COR. Moreover, if participation in the COR grows, there
may even be discrimination between those job applicants with
a COR and without a COR, with employers hiring more of the
former. Normally discrimination carries a negative
connotation, however, in the context of minimizing collateral
consequences, this type of discrimination could incentivize ex-
offenders to obtain a COR, which would necessarily require
them to live lawfully, to become rehabilitated, and to apply for
a COR. As previously stated, there is no one solution to the
problem of collateral consequences but without an attempt to
provide resolution, such as a federal COR program, the status
quo for ex-offenders will remain particularly problematic in the
employment context.
B. Increased Employer Tax Incentives
Because certificates of rehabilitation cannot completely
prohibit employment discrimination,341 Congress should also
augment the use and publicity of the Work Opportunity Tax
Credit (WOTC) program.342 The WOTC’s goal is to “further the
partnership between the employment and training system and
the private sector in dealing with problems of the
disadvantaged and the unemployed.”343 Employers who enroll
in the program can receive a tax credit for hiring ex-offenders
ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS 1 (2017),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NKP2-VFBC].
340 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 297.
341 Id. at 129–30.
342 See Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Apr. 8, 2010), https://
www.doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax/eligible.cfm [https://perma.cc/YT4S-WT7J]; see
also Adele Burney, Tax Breaks for Employers Who Hire Felons, CHRON, http://small
business.chron.com/tax-breaks-employers-hire-felons-14421.html [https://perma.cc/R8L
E-H7K9].
343 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ETA HANDBOOK NO. 408, at I-4 (2002), https://www.
doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax/pdf/ETA_Handbook_408_Nov_2002_3rd_Edition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5CH-GV9K].
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“equal to 25% or 40% of a new employee’s first year wages, up
to the maximum for the target group to which the employee
belongs.”344 The WOTC refers to ex-offenders as the target
group called “Ex-Felons” and requires a person to be
convicted of a felony under any statute of the United States or any
State; and has a hiring date which is not more than one (1) year after
the last date on which he/she was so convicted or was released from
prison; and is a member of an economically disadvantaged family.345
Moreover, based upon the ex-felon target group, a business can
receive a maximum tax credit of anywhere from $1500 to $2400
depending on the number of hours an ex-felon works.346
Scholars argue that money might not be “the ultimate
motivator” and tax incentives should be provided to “disadvantaged
workers generally.”347 With some improvements to the ex-felon
target group of the WOTC, employers might view tax incentives
as not simply “motivators” to hire ex-offenders, but rather
beneficial aids to help weigh the risks of hiring an ex-offender.348
To increase the potential positive effects of the WOTC on ex-
offender employment discrimination, Congress can make the
following adjustments: extend the hiring date limitation to not
more than three years after an offender is convicted or released
from prison; relax the requirement that an ex-felon be a member
of an economically disadvantaged family by increasing the
percentage threshold of the Lower Living Standard Income
Levels to 90% or 100%; and increase the maximum tax credit an
employer may receive per ex-offender.349
In 2001, a study in California showed that “over 40 percent
of employers indicated that they would ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ not
be willing to hire an applicant with a criminal record” even for a
344 WOTC Tax Credit Amounts, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Apr. 8, 2010), https://www.
doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax/benefits.cfm [https://perma.cc/QN6Q-3NCX].
345 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 343, at II-5. A certain income level threshold,
calculated by the Bureau of Labor’s “Lower Living Standard Income Levels,” defines the
economically disadvantaged family. Id.
346 WOTC Tax Credit Amounts, supra note 344.
347 Under the WOTC, a number of disadvantaged groups are helped. See generally
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 343; see also JACOBS, supra note 2, at 300; Drake Baer,
Why Incentives Don’t Actually Motivate People to Do Better Work, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 1,
2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-incentives-dont-actually-make-people-do-better-
work-2014-3 [https://perma.cc/NGH4-PMTB] (discussing why monetary incentives fail to
incentivize individual workers).
348 A tax benefit may financially persuade an employer to hire an ex-offender
because it provides the employer with economic assistance that can balance out any
economic risk that hiring an ex-offender may present.
349 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 343, at II-5–II-6.
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job that did not require a college degree.350 Although professors
conducted this survey fifteen years ago, employment
discrimination is still a deleterious collateral consequence of a
criminal conviction.351 Combining economic incentives to hire
ex-offenders,352 along with certificates of rehabilitation,353 can
promote the hiring of ex-offenders to help achieve the ultimate
goal of rehabilitating those individuals into free society.
CONCLUSION
In the reality of the twenty-first century, expanding
federal expungement of criminal records to handle the
problem of societal exclusion of ex-offenders is simply a patch
or Band-Aid for the larger problems of the criminal justice
system.354 History demonstrates that expungement is a
limited remedy reserved for correcting violations of personal
rights.355 It is not a catch-all provision to abolish the workings
of the American criminal prosecution structure.356
To create a more workable solution to federal ex-
offender reentry problems, we must go to the root of the
problem—how we, as a society, view and prejudice ex-
offenders.357 Federal criminal prosecution serves the country by
bringing justice to many victims of crime; pretending as though
criminal prosecution never occurred can undermine the very
purpose of the federal district courts and ultimately not solve
the employment maintenance issue many ex-offenders face. As
previously demonstrated, the federal judiciary is unwilling and
unable to expand jurisdiction over equitable expungement
motions—therefore the equitable federal expungement
applications cannot help overcome barriers ex-offenders face in
obtaining employment. Creating economically viable incentives
for employers to hire ex-offenders can help alleviate
employment issues that face the federal ex-prison population
while keeping federal criminal expungement within its proper
confines.358 Additionally, exploring the use of federal
certificates of rehabilitation can give federal district courts a
350 Harry J. Holzer et al., How Willing Are Employers to Hire Ex-offenders?, 23
FOCUS 40, 40–41 (2004), http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc232h.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JZ54-3FF7].
351 JACOBS, supra note 2, at 264.
352 See WOTC Tax Credit Amounts, supra note 344.
353 Love, supra note 322, at 22.
354 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 120, 130–31.
355 United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 540 (2d Cir. 1977).
356 See Love, supra note 13, at 753, 755, 759.
357 Id. at 755.
358 See supra Section IV.B.
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more proper authority with which to resolve what they may
deem extreme injustices.
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